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001 978-94-007-7917-4
003 DE-He213
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008 131118s2014 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9789400779174
_9978-94-007-7917-4
024 7 _a10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4
_2doi
050 4 _aB65
072 7 _aHPS
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI019000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a320.01
_223
100 1 _aCampbell, Catherine Galko.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aPersons, Identity, and Political Theory
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Defense of Rawlsian Political Identity /
_cby Catherine Galko Campbell.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2014.
300 _aXI, 187 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _aDedication -- Acknowledgments -- Table of Contents -- Chapter 1: Political Identity, Perfectionism and Neutrality -- Chapter 2: Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory -- Chapter 3: Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls’s Conception of the Person.- Chapter 4: Taylor’s Conception of Persons and His Theory of Personal Identity.- Chapter 5: Defense of the Original Position.- Chapter 6: Objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of Persons -- Chapter 7: Defense of Rawls’s Political Conception of the Person.- Chapter 8: Rawlsian Political Identity -- Index.
520 _aThis book examines the conception of the person at work in John Rawls’s writings from Theory of Justice to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.  The book aims to show that objections to Rawls’s political conception of the person fail and that a Rawlsian conception of political identity is defensible.  The book shows that the debate between liberals and communitarians is relevant to the current debate regarding perfectionism and neutrality in politics, and clarifies the debate between Rawls and communitarians in a way that will promote fruitful discussion on the issue of political identity.  It does this by providing a clearer account of a conception of personal identity according to which persons are socially constituted, including the intuitions and assumptions underlying the communitarians’ conception of persons as “socially constituted.”  It examines the communitarian objections to liberal political theory and to the liberal conception of persons, the “unencumbered self.”  The book differentiates between two types of objection to the liberal conception of persons: the metaphysical and normative.  It explains Rawls's political conception of persons, and the metaphysical and normative commitments Rawls incurs—and does not incur—in virtue of that conception.  It shows that both kind of objection to Rawls's political conception of the person fail.  Finally, modifying Rawls’s political conception of the person, a Rawlsian conception of political identity is explained and defended. 
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aEthics.
650 0 _aPolitical science
_xPhilosophy.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Philosophy.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Theory.
650 2 4 _aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.
650 2 4 _aEthics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789400779167
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c94140
_d94140