000 04016nam a22004575i 4500
001 978-3-642-02865-6
003 DE-He213
005 20140220084524.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100623s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642028656
_9978-3-642-02865-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6
_2doi
050 4 _aHB1-846.8
072 7 _aKCA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS069030
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330.1
_223
100 1 _aVan Deemen, Adrian.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aCollective Decision Making
_h[electronic resource] :
_bViews from Social Choice and Game Theory /
_cedited by Adrian Van Deemen, Agnieszka Rusinowska.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg,
_c2010.
300 _aXIV, 266 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aTheory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research,
_x0924-6126 ;
_v43
505 0 _aFrom Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result -- The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists -- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models -- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules -- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making -- Rights Revisited, and Limited -- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes -- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof -- Making (Non-standard) Choices -- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach -- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the European Union -- Stabilizing Power Sharing -- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games -- Networks, Information and Choice -- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets -- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games.
520 _aThis book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aFinance.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aEconomic Theory.
650 2 4 _aPublic Finance & Economics.
700 1 _aRusinowska, Agnieszka.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642028649
830 0 _aTheory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research,
_x0924-6126 ;
_v43
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
999 _c111447
_d111447