000 03885nam a22005055i 4500
001 978-3-642-02839-7
003 DE-He213
005 20140220084524.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100628s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642028397
_9978-3-642-02839-7
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
_2doi
050 4 _aHB1-846.8
072 7 _aKCA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS069030
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330.1
_223
100 1 _aLaslier, Jean-François.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aHandbook on Approval Voting
_h[electronic resource] /
_cedited by Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg,
_c2010.
300 _aXVIII, 480p. 49 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
505 0 _ato the Handbook on Approval Voting -- History of Approval Voting -- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting -- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting -- Axiomatic Theory -- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences -- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting -- Committees -- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections -- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? -- Strategic Voting -- The Basic Approval Voting Game -- Approval Voting in Large Electorates -- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting -- Probabilistic Exercises -- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives -- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting -- In Silico Voting Experiments -- Experiments -- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting -- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections -- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment -- Electoral Competition -- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting -- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections -- Meaning for Individual and Society -- Describing Society Through Approval Data -- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference.
520 _aUnder Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 0 _aFinance.
650 0 _aPolitical science.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aEconomic Theory.
650 2 4 _aPublic Finance & Economics.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Science.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
700 1 _aSanver, M. Remzi.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642028380
830 0 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
999 _c111443
_d111443