000 | 03051nam a22004935i 4500 | ||
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001 | 978-3-642-02791-8 | ||
003 | DE-He213 | ||
005 | 20140220084524.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 100301s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9783642027918 _9978-3-642-02791-8 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8 _2doi |
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050 | 4 | _aHD39.5 | |
072 | 7 |
_aKJMV8 _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aBUS076000 _2bisacsh |
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082 | 0 | 4 |
_a658.72 _223 |
100 | 1 |
_aHöhn, Michaela Isabel. _eauthor. |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aRelational Supply Contracts _h[electronic resource] : _bOptimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements / _cby Michaela Isabel Höhn. |
264 | 1 |
_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg, _c2010. |
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300 |
_aXVI, 124 p. 31 illus. _bonline resource. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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490 | 1 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v629 |
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505 | 0 | _aLiterature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook. | |
520 | _aSupply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model. | ||
650 | 0 | _aEconomics. | |
650 | 0 | _aMathematical optimization. | |
650 | 0 | _aEconomics, Mathematical. | |
650 | 0 | _aIndustrial procurement. | |
650 | 1 | 4 | _aEconomics/Management Science. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aProcurement. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aOperations Research/Decision Theory. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aOptimization. |
710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783642027901 |
830 | 0 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v629 |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8 |
912 | _aZDB-2-SBE | ||
999 |
_c111437 _d111437 |