000 03051nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-3-642-02791-8
003 DE-He213
005 20140220084524.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642027918
_9978-3-642-02791-8
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8
_2doi
050 4 _aHD39.5
072 7 _aKJMV8
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS076000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a658.72
_223
100 1 _aHöhn, Michaela Isabel.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aRelational Supply Contracts
_h[electronic resource] :
_bOptimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements /
_cby Michaela Isabel Höhn.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg,
_c2010.
300 _aXVI, 124 p. 31 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
_x0075-8442 ;
_v629
505 0 _aLiterature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook.
520 _aSupply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aMathematical optimization.
650 0 _aEconomics, Mathematical.
650 0 _aIndustrial procurement.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aProcurement.
650 2 4 _aOperations Research/Decision Theory.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods.
650 2 4 _aOptimization.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642027901
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
_x0075-8442 ;
_v629
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
999 _c111437
_d111437