000 03250nam a22005175i 4500
001 978-3-642-21096-9
003 DE-He213
005 20140220083258.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 111019s2012 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642210969
_9978-3-642-21096-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9
_2doi
050 4 _aHB172
072 7 _aKCC
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS044000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a338.5
_223
100 1 _aServatius, Philipp.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aNetwork Economics and the Allocation of Savings
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market /
_cby Philipp Servatius.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2012.
300 _aXV, 297p. 48 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
_x0075-8442 ;
_v653
505 0 _aMotivation and Nontechnical Overview -- Selected Theoretical Concepts: The Theory of Games -- Network Theory in Economics. Applications to Peering in Telecommunications: Telecommunications and the Internet -- A Model of Peering Among VoIP Firms -- Network Formation in Peering -- Concluding Remarks -- Selected Mathematical Concepts.
520 _aThis book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 0 _aMicroeconomics.
650 0 _aEconomics, Mathematical.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aMicroeconomics.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
650 2 4 _aInformation Systems Applications (incl. Internet).
650 2 4 _aR & D/Technology Policy.
650 2 4 _aInnovation/Technology Management.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642210952
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
_x0075-8442 ;
_v653
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
999 _c101970
_d101970