Strategic Social Choice [electronic resource] : Stable Representations of Constitutions / by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters.
By: Peleg, Bezalel [author.].
Contributor(s): Peters, Hans [author.] | SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type:![materialTypeLabel](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
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